A federal judge has issued a significant ruling that could alter the course of U.S. immigration enforcement by permitting the government to deport certain Venezuelan nationals suspected of involvement with organized crime under a rarely-used wartime statute.
The case centers around the Alien Enemies Act (AEA), a law enacted in 1798 during the presidency of John Adams and originally designed for use in times of declared war or insurrection. Under the AEA, the president has the authority to detain and remove non-citizens from ‘hostile foreign nations’ in circumstances of war or a “predatory incursion” into U.S. territory.
In the current case before the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania, Judge Stephanie Haines upheld the Joe Biden administration’s March directive that designated Tren de Aragua — a Venezuelan gang alleged to have transnational operations — as a hostile foreign organization under the statute. The directive thus enabled the government to move for removal of Venezuelan nationals believed to be members or associates of that organization.
What makes this ruling particularly groundbreaking is that it marks one of the first-ever successful applications of the 1798 law not against a formal foreign state or nation at war with the U.S., but rather against a non-state, transnational criminal network. The traditional usage of the Alien Enemies Act has been extremely limited: prior invocations occurred during the War of 1812, World War I and World II, and always in the context of open conflict between the U.S. and a foreign power.
By applying the statute to a gang rather than a sovereign state, the government is pushing the boundaries of executive removal power. It signals that the administration views organized criminal groups with foreign-origin ties as not merely law-enforcement matters but as national-security threats warranting wartime-style tools. If this decision stands and is replicated, it could open the door to broader uses of the Alien Enemies Act in immigration and criminal enforcement contexts.
At the same time, the ruling has raised serious legal and constitutional questions. Critics argue that the statute requires a state of war or an actual foreign government’s hostile action against the U.S., and that applying it to a private criminal enterprise stretches the law beyond its intended scope. Additionally, the form of due process guaranteed in ordinary immigration proceedings differs from what the AEA contemplates, which traditionally allows for detentions and removals without the full range of protections available in ordinary deportation cases. The Supreme Court has already weighed in on related issues, holding that detainees subject to removal under the statute must be given adequate notice and an opportunity to challenge their status.
In her decision, Judge Haines acknowledged the historic nature of the case and the legal novelty of applying the AEA in this context. She found that the government’s characterization of Tren de Aragua met the statute’s threshold in terms of “hostile action” and concluded that it was within the executive branch’s discretion to designate the group and proceed with removal of non-citizen affiliates. Nonetheless, she emphasized that any individual subject to removal must be accorded the opportunity for review (via habeas corpus and other procedural protections).
The implications of this ruling extend far beyond the specific case. Immigration law scholars and civil-rights advocates are paying close attention. Some fear the precedent could be used to target non-citizens from other countries, especially if the government labels foreign-origin criminal networks or gangs as “foreign enemies.” The ruling may also spur Congress to clarify or amend the statute to define whether and how it should apply to non-state actors. On the other hand, proponents argue that the decision gives law-enforcement and national-security agencies a powerful new tool to combat organized crime with international reach that exploits U.S. immigration systems and safe havens.
As the case moves forward, several questions remain. How will courts define the threshold of “invasion or predatory incursion” when applied to criminal gangs rather than armies? Will future administrations use the statute more broadly, and if so, will courts push back? Will Congress act to modernize the law or restrict its application? And importantly, how will this affect the rights of non-citizens who may face removal under an expanded interpretation of the law?
In sum, this ruling by Judge Haines signals a turning point in how the U.S. government may enforce immigration and national-security policy. By reviving a nearly two-century-old statute and applying it to a modern transnational criminal organization, the government is charting new terrain. Whether this becomes a model for future enforcement or a legal flashpoint remains to be seen.